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Abstract 
In recent years, social housing providers in the UK have become influential actors in realising 
the national government’s decarbonisation agenda. However, when decarbonisation is 
considered in light of austerity measures and privatisation of public housing, a number of 
contradictions arise. From interviews and a workshop with policymakers and registered 
providers in the city-region of Greater Manchester, three tensions are highlighted. First, since 
the 1980s, the housing stock condition has been used as a political pawn in successive 
reforms to demunicipalize social housing. Second, local authorities continue to harness the 
collectivities that remain in the social housing sector to realise their decarbonisation goals. 
Third, the retrofit practices of social landlords are only superficially aiming for carbon 
control, instead they focus on the social aims that are seen as important to the ethos and 
business model of the landlord.  The paper concludes that there are unavoidable conflicts 
between the interests of different actors whose low carbon economy is conceived at different 
spatial scales and with different underlying objectives.  As social landlords are foregrounded 
in sub-regional low carbon policy, they are effectively co-opted into market-based retrofit, 
resulting in unintended consequences for the social housing sector.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, social housing providers in the UK have become influential actors in realising 
the national government’s decarbonisation agenda. Reducing the carbon footprint of existing 
housing is seen as beneficial to the environment, economy, and social welfare. However, 
when decarbonisation is considered in light of austerity measures and privatisation of public 
housing, a number of contradictions arise. This paper provides insights from empirical 
research on market-based low carbon retrofit in the city-region of Greater Manchester. This 
paper engages with three main arguments in the context of a policy push for low carbon 
retrofit in the English social housing sector. These are 1) the economic and political utility of 
the social housing stock and its condition, 2) the role of the carbon control agenda in 
elevating social landlords in the sub-regional space, and 3) the subsequent strategies for 
market-based retrofit in social housing.  
 
As a consequence of Post-Fordist economic restructuring (Jessop, 1993), there is an 
increasing gap between the bricks and mortar of social housing estates and local authorities. 
Having all but lost their capacity to act directly in the housing sector, and as carbon control is 
elevated to a “first order policy concern” (While et al., 2010), local government actors are 
searching for effective multi-level governance mechanisms to transcend the urban and create 
networks of actors across different levels of social organisation (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; 
Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007).  In the English context, this task is influenced by emerging 
“carbon geographies” (Bridge et al., 2013), as well as “eco-state restructuring” (While et al., 
2010) whereby the pursuit of CO2 emissions reduction, among other sustainability measures, 
is delegated to lower tiers of government. These forces have given rise to a supra-local 
metropolitan tier of low carbon polity in several UK city regions, and the social housing 
sector has emerged as a strategic low carbon instrument for city region actors. 
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This research focuses on retrofit practices in the social housing sector, and collaborative 
efforts between “low carbon stakeholders” among the city-region policymakers. The research 
is informed by semi-structured interviews, a collaborative workshop and participant 
observation conducted in Greater Manchester in 2013-2014. First, thirteen semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with representatives of registered social housing providers and the 
city-region’s low carbon policymakers. These housing providers included independent social 
landlords, Arms Length Management Organisations (ALMOs), and stock transfer landlords 
that are active in Greater Manchester and have completed significant housing retrofit 
programmes. The interviews were transcribed and analysed thematically, focusing on retrofit 
actors and partnerships, and their main motivations. All direct quotations in the manuscript 
are from these interviews. In addition, participant observation took place at meetings of the 
Low Carbon Hub in Greater Manchester. The fieldwork concluded with a workshop in 
October 2014 where the preliminary results of the research were shared with 24 registered 
providers, retrofit contractors and local authorities.  
 
The paper begins by summarising the connections between social housing stock conditions 
and demunicipalisation before describing the rise of the supra-local low carbon polity in 
Greater Manchester. The relationships and motivations of the city region’s policy elite and 
social landlords are considered from the perspective of low carbon retrofit policy and 
practices.  The authors conclude that social landlords use retrofit practices to respond to the 
risks and pressures arising from the ongoing austerity agenda in the UK.  Given the emphasis 
given to the low carbon economy in city region policymaking, social landlords’ status has 
been elevated among the city-region’s political and business elites. However, the interests of 
the national and local state, as well as private actors in low carbon retrofit market do not 
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neatly align in the sub-regional space, and several paradoxes emerge from the prevalent 
market-based logic on low carbon retrofit. This suggests that low carbon retrofit may result in 
unintended consequences for the social housing sector while failing to realise the intended 
carbon reductions as promised by proponents of carbon market. 
 
The demunicipalization of social housing and local sustainability capability 
Since the general election of 2010, social housing has been targeted by the government for 
the purposes of expanding the market through “a radical resurrection of the Thatcherite 
agenda” (Hodkinson & Robbins, 2013, p. 59). Under these austerity-driven policies, punitive 
measures have been imposed on social tenants under the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and 
justified under the deficit reduction programme (Hall et al., 2013). The impact of these policy 
decisions are felt not only by tenants but also by social landlords at an institutional level. 
Austerity fallouts or knock-on effects create significant financial and operational risks to 
social landlords in terms of rent revenue and sustainability of tenancies. This research focuses 
on how social landlords have responded to these risks and pressures by mobilising low 
carbon retrofit as a strategic response to operational threats.   
 
The political story of austerity and welfare cuts has been popularised by mainstream media 
outlets and mobilised by the political opponents of the government in the UK general election 
of 2017. In addition, there are significant structural changes to the social housing sector that 
are less visible to the public.  The logic of these stealthy reforms has been to continue the 
demunicipalization of social housing set in motion by the Thatcher administration and 
propelled forward by the “Third Way politics” of the New Labour government in 1997-2010 
(Hodgkinson and Robbins, 2013, p. 63). In this most recent tranche of reforms, legislated in 
the Localism Act of 2011, new fiscal regulations were introduced to the Housing Revenue 
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Account. The so-called self-financing regime applicable to the housing stock that remains in 
local authority ownership includes a borrowing cap – an arbitrary limit to the amount that the 
local authority can borrow to invest in its housing stock. This has resulted in several local 
authorities relinquishing their remaining social housing assets, often citing investment 
pressures for future energy efficiency requirements as a primary driver.  Examples of this in 
the case study area of Greater Manchester include Bolton, Oldham, Rochdale and Salford, 
jointly representing a stock of over 50,000 council-owned houses that has been transferred 
away from local government ownership after the new borrowing cap was introduced. Table 1 
provides details of housing stock size and institutional arrangements by the ten local 
authorities in Greater Manchester. 
 
The retreat of local authorities as owners of social housing is a long term trend that began 
with post-Fordist reforms in 1980s. Housing statistics reveal that local authorities in England 
owned 1.64 million dwellings on 1 April 2015, a decrease of 1.5 per cent from 2014 (DCLG, 
2016). Since 1994, local authority ownership has dropped by more than half (from 3.67 
million as at April 1994) as a direct consequence of government policy such as Right to Buy 
and large scale voluntary transfers. In the same time period, local authorities have gradually 
emerged as the main actors of climate protection and sustainability (Betsill & Bulkeley, 
2007). This reveals two contradictory trends involving the privatisation of social housing and 
the increasing reliance on local authorities to reduce carbon emissions. In other words, there 
is increasing pressure to reduce carbon emissions through local and sub-regional governance, 
but a weakened capacity for local authorities to achieve this.  
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The institutions and instruments of market-based retrofit  
National political contexts have an important influence on the mobilisation and 
operationalisation of sustainability agendas by local and regional governments (Voisey et al., 
1996). In the UK, local government has historically lacked powers (Bulkeley & Kearns, 
2006) and the demunicipalization of social housing has accelerated this. Traditionally, 
housing retrofit has been the domain of national policymakers and the privatised utility 
industries. However, the latter sector has been deemed ineffective in delivering sustainability 
(Eyre, 1998; Hannon et al., 2013). From the perspective of a political project, the 
involvement of the utility industry in energy efficiency retrofit is an example of neo-liberal 
“roll-out” strategy, following the fall-outs from the post-Fordist deregulation and “rolling 
back” of the state (Peck & Tickell, 2002). In pre-war Britain, nearly two thirds of the 
electricity supply industry and one third of gas supply was owned by large municipalities 
with the remainder in private ownership (Robson, 1950). Immediately after the war, 
electricity supply and other important industries were nationalized, similar to other developed 
countries (ibid). The subsequent wave of privatization and deregulation of nationalized 
industries during the 1980s and 1990s, is said to have been the most significant in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Pollit, 1999). The 
reforms were intended to create “ideal” market conditions for competition, increased 
efficiency and lower consumer prices by minimising state involvement.  These reforms had 
mixed results; UK consumers enjoyed low energy prices for many decades while energy 
efficiency goals were not realised because deregulated energy markets had no incentive to 
reduce energy consumption (Eyre, 1998; Meyer, 2003). Therefore, to “stimulate the 
industry’s involvement in energy efficiency”, especially through “demand side management”, 
the government intervened to re-regulate the market (Eyre, 1998, p. 965).  
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Peck and Tickell (2002, p. 385) argue that whereas the national state used to be “the principal 
anchoring point for institutions” under the Fordist-Keynesian model, inter-urban competition 
became necessary “cutting social and environmental regulatory standards and eroding the 
political and institutional collectivities upon which more progressive settlements had been 
constructed in the past”. Utility privatization, as well as the demunicipalization of social 
housing, form a central pillar of the 1980’s roll-back neoliberal strategies (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001). As the market failings become apparent, active re-regulation and state 
intervention was required to repair the failings of earlier policies while “extending and 
bolstering market logic” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 389). This chain of events is clearly 
evidenced in the field of energy efficiency. 
 
The involvement of the utility sector in reducing domestic carbon emissions via market 
mechanisms has had a direct influence on the way in which social landlords have carried out 
low carbon retrofit, with social housing stock caught up in these waves of “roll back” and 
“roll-out” neoliberalism. Smyth (2013, p. 39) posits that since the 1980s, social housing was 
starved of funds which led to an “unsustainable backlog of repairs and maintenance”. To 
address this policy failure, the so-called Decent Homes policy options were developed to 
improve council housing during the Labour administration (1997-2010) (Pawson, 2006; 
Smyth, 2013). ). The obligation to bring social rented homes into a “decent standard” was 
tied to a performance and grant regime, that was available only on the condition that local 
authority housing stock was delegated to an ALMO where the local authority would still 
retain ownership of the housing stock; ‘stock transfer’ whereby the ownership of the stock 
was transferred to a new independent landlord; or a “Private Finance Initiative” (Pawson, 
2007; Ginsburg, 2005) – the latter a market-based instrument that the Labour government 
became infamous for (Raco, 2014; Wilks-Heeg, 2009). However, evidence has shown that 
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improving socially rented homes was a “Trojan Horse” for the privatisation agenda, where 
local authorities and notably council tenants were cajoled into voting in favour of new 
management models, in exchange for home improvements (Ginsburg, 2005; Smyth, 2013). 
The policy was thus designed to further uncouple the historically strong ties between local 
government and social housing that emerged in the Fordist-Keynesian era. While the historic 
link between the social programmes and ‘pro-poor’ housing policies was pronounced in the 
UK and Europe more widely, this was absent in the US where socialist values were 
marginalised in the post-war political settlement (Valverde, 2011).  Although English local 
government no longer owns much housing stock, the institutional collectivities associated 
with the sector remain. These collectivities have led the social housing sector to be 
foregrounded in low carbon polity in GM, their perceived market influence being the reason. 
The chief executive of Registered Provider 1 argues that, “Potentially we can put pressure on 
the private sector, one way or the other, because when they have a GM target to increase 
SAP ratings, cross the whole of GM, I think if social housing partners can lead on it, it’s like 
then we can set the market for the private sector, we can effect funding […]”. 
 
The social housing sector is perceived to be more responsive to state influence when 
compared with the private rented and owner occupied sectors. The deep-seated problems with 
meaningfully regulating or even engaging with the private rented sector about stock condition 
are well documented (Crook & Hughes, 2001; Kemp, 2011). Thus, social housing serves as a 
vehicle to develop an attractive retrofit market that can then draw in the private rental and 
owner sectors. In effect, the social housing stock serves as a test bed for products and 
services, and the sector provides leverage for the domestic retrofit market.  
 
The logic and geographies of carbon control 
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The “eco-state’s” relationship with territorial carbon governance and targets (While et al., 
2010) is central to the main argument put forward in this paper about Greater Manchester’s 
low carbon policy. At the time of writing, the UK government forwards a narrative of 
localism that is underpinned by an entrepreneurial economic agenda. This is represented by 
so called city deals such as the “Northern Powerhouse” (Osborne, 2014, 2015; Haughton et 
al., 2016; Nurse et al., 2017), relating to Greater Manchester’s “devolution agenda” (HM 
Treasury and GMCA, 2014). The dominant low carbon polity follows the contours of this 
fashionable sub-regional economic geography. The Low Carbon Hub created as part of the 
City Deal (AGMA, 2012) between Whitehall and the newly constituted Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority (GMCA), reflects an underlying economic decentralisation agenda, 
which for the political right is primarily about increasing competition (Rodriquez-Pose & 
Sandall, 2008). The aim of Greater Manchester’s Low Carbon Hub is central to the city 
region’s economic growth strategy (AGMA, 2012). It is through a low-carbon, pro-growth 
agenda that Greater Manchester aims to create a regional economy that can rebalance the UK 
economy that is over reliant on the South East. 
 
Local governments are interested in carbon control not simply due to the negative effects of 
anthropogenic climate change but also due to the spatial implications of low carbon economic 
development (Bridge et al., 2013). Low carbon has emerged as an economic trump card in the 
same cities that not long ago considered climate discussions at best marginal to the 
mainstream issue of jobs, economic growth and inward investment. Hodson and Marvin 
(2010) describe this as an “eco-competitive race” where ecological issues are tied to market 
performance. In this case study, the “spatiality of carbon governance” (While et al., 2010, p. 
77) is increasingly expressed through the supra-local mechanisms of Greater Manchester. 
Here, the political and economic leadership is increasingly funnelled through the city-region 
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machinations that have only loose ties with local democracy as conceived through elected 
local government. The GM Low Carbon Hub Board, a metropolitan low carbon polity 
executive, includes members from the private sector (such as Siemens, Arup, Manchester 
Airport Group, and the Cooperative Group) as well as public sector actors from education 
and housing. As such, the Hub represents a new low carbon orientation for the pre-existing 
‘grant coalitions’ in Manchester (Cochrane et al., 1996; Jones & Ward, 1998). Social housing 
sector is one of many sectors that are implicated in this new low carbon configuration of city-
region governance.  
 
Community-based retrofit and the market’s “carbon gaze” 
The low carbon agenda in Greater Manchester includes many of the deficiencies of preceding 
notions of sustainable development. Sustainability originally encompassed a social dimension 
as per the Bruntland report but has largely been interpreted through economic and 
environmental issues (Vallance et al., 2011) while neglecting questions of social justice and 
democratic governance relating to the governance of urban areas, key infrastructures and 
assets (Raco, 2014). Moreover, While and colleagues (2010, p. 88-9) argue that there has 
been a shift from “discursively strong but materially weak trade-off between economic and 
environmental goals, to a harder-edged instrumental concern with reducing carbon 
emissions as a first order policy concern.” This conceptual narrowing of sustainability to 
carbon control has resulted in the downscaling of climate responsibilities to lower tiers of 
government in order to “mobilize strategic interests and actors to undertake specific projects 
and activities” (ibid, p. 80). As such, these activities are increasingly concerned with 
controlling carbon emissions on a territorial basis. 
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While the territorial logic of carbon geographies has given rise to international perspectives 
on carbon trading, carbon budgets, and renewable energy policies (Bridge et al., 2013 ), local 
and community  perspectives are also relevant, particularly in the housing sector (Karvonen, 
2013; Heiskanen et al., 2010; Walker, 2011). We argue that the carbon gaze of market-based 
housing retrofit is focused on this local scale, opening up different ways of understanding 
community-based retrofit.  Low carbon retrofit in social housing estates involves a 
combination of interventions in the built environment as well as social programmes (e.g., 
education, health and information campaigns) to reduce the carbon footprint of social 
housing.  
 
While and colleagues (2010) note that whilst carbon control and eco-state restructuring are 
not inherently anti-progressive, they have mainly centred on neoliberal market 
environmentalism and have effectively excluded those issues that lack economic value. 
Social housing therefore seems like an unlikely investment target in a traditional sense of 
market valorization. Historically, the post-Fordist regime de-incentivised public investment 
while funnelling the most vulnerable members of society into this tenure (Hodgkinson & 
Robbins, 2012). This has resulted in a stigmatisation of social housing in a society that is 
increasingly focused on values of commodification (Flint & Rowlands, 2003). And yet, the 
findings from this research reveal that social landlords are at the vanguard of low carbon 
retrofit and green investment. This shift of social housing from the periphery to centre stage 
is fuelled by eco-state restructuring that emphasises local and regional retrofit markets. For 
example, the global consultancy firm Arup (2013) states that social landlords can stimulate 
wider change because they can develop and influence the supply chain and capacity in the 
retrofit market. This creates a perverse situation where a longstanding public sector service is 
being reframed as a vanguard of private sector market environmentalism. 
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The emergence of a low carbon agenda in the Manchester city region 
Since the Industrial Revolution, Manchester’s “boosterist” political and business 
communities have seen the management of natural resources as part of the economic 
development agenda. For example, public health interventions to maintain the city’s air and 
water quality were undertaken to ensure economic prosperity for the city (MacKillop, 2012). 
However, sub-regional governance to address residential carbon emissions has only recently 
emerged, despite the longstanding evidence suggesting that a city region approach could be 
beneficial (McEvoy, 2001). Manchester city region has a history of over 25 years (Deas, 
2014) but prior to 2007, interviewees argued that there was “a total absence at city region 
level” of coordinated carbon reduction policy, and at local authority level such policies used 
to be “completely vague or disconnected” (Senior Manager, GM Low Carbon Hub).  This 
could be explained by the negative experiences of the Agenda 21 implementation that caused 
Manchester’s economic and political elite to distance themselves from the 
“environmentalists” (While et al., 2004). A change occurred around the time of the Climate 
Change Act 2008 when a Mini Stern review was commissioned to assess the economic 
impact of climate change legislation for the Manchester City Region (Deloitte, 2008). 
Consequently, the GM Climate Change Strategy (2011) set out the target for carbon 
emissions reduction of 48% by 2020. A bespoke GM housing retrofit strategy interpreted this 
low-carbon ambition by setting a target of 90% of the city-region’s housing stock to reach 
Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) level B by 2035. Thus, the social housing stock 
emerged as a golden opportunity to realise the low carbon ambitions of the city region. 
 
Social landlords in Greater Manchester  
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The community of GM social landlords is heterogeneous and geographically unbounded from 
the city region. It is made up of historically independent social landlords and landlords with 
accommodation that is owned or previously owned by the local GM authorities. The latter 
dominate the sector with a ratio of 3 to 1 homes being associated with the ten GM local 
authorities; the social rented sector overall accounts for almost 1 in 4 homes in GM (AGMA, 
2008). Recent mergers in the sector have grown the size of independent social landlords. 
They range from large national and regional outfits with stock size of up to 150,000, to 
smaller landlords with a stock of about 4,000 or less, spread across the region or concentrated 
in one local authority area, sometimes in just one ward. In the early- to mid-2000s, most of 
the GM local authorities transferred their stock to one or more independent landlords or 
created one or more Arms Length Management Organisations (ALMOs). This change was 
required under the Decent Homes funding conditions at the time. See Table 1 for a brief 
summary of the institutional arrangements for local authority housing in GM. Four of the 
original GM ALMOs (Bolton, Oldham, Rochdale, and Salford) recently became stock 
transfer landlords. In a few cases nationally, including one in GM (Wigan), local authorities 
have scrapped their ALMOs and brought the social housing stock back under direct 
management. This institutional landscape is still in flux and further changes are expected 
across the sector in England. 
 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Organisationally, those landlords with links to council-owned stock, either transferred or still 
under council ownership via ALMOs, tend to have closer ties with the city-region polity. 
Geographically their stock is in GM, and historically, staff used to work for the parent local 
authority: “the AGMA [Association of Greater Manchester Authorities] link is really strong 
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and because the whole stock is within Greater Manchester they absolutely see the strategic 
alignment with AGMA” (Director, GM Low Carbon Hub).   
 
In terms of the sub-regional implications of the recent restructuring relating to carbon 
management, While and colleagues (2010) predict that it could lead to two opposing 
“experiments in reterritorialisation of governance” that either increased collaboration in or 
resist city-regional governance. The case of GM illustrates how the former strategy has been 
mobilized by the pre-existing metropolitan political and economic regime. The GM 
stakeholders maintain that the city region model is beneficial for communities, from a 
strategic resource and policy coordination perspective.  One GM policy stakeholder 
suggested that the centralized city-regional coordination made it easier to develop “consistent 
neighbourhood characterisation, identify strategic opportunities and housing stock 
profiling.” A research effort was undertaken at the GM level to provide comprehensive stock 
condition data from social housing providers to create a holistic perspective on the city-
region’s socially rented stock that could be used for low carbon strategizing. In addition, city 
region advocates argue that large energy companies find it more “manageable” to work with 
a centralised point of contact for the ten local authorities rather than individual landlords or 
local authorities. However, this view is contradicted by evidence from social landlords 
regarding large utility-funded retrofit schemes. Each individual landlord collaborated with 
large energy companies directly, either independently or with contractors who specialise in 
social housing partnerships with the “big six” utility companies. The chief executive of 
Registered Provider 1 notes: “a lot of people use their contractor partners as a mechanism to 
get their grant funding [from utilities], because more and more of the big contractors have 
people specialised in working with the utilities.” 
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A range of political tensions exist among the local authorities that comprise the city-region. 
There is a commonly held perception that GM activities disproportionately serve Manchester 
City Council’s strategic aims. As a senior manager of Registered Provider 2 notes: “AGMA, 
again, if it’s not Manchester-led then it tends to go nowhere.” These internal rivalries among 
local authorities in GM are a long-standing feature of its metropolitan governance (Deas, 
2014). These ongoing frictions make the city region model highly politicized and this, some 
interviewees argued, creates barriers to the low carbon agenda. The chief executive of 
Registered Provider 1 states:  “There was an AGMA approach to having a Manchester-wide 
solar PV scheme, probably about four years ago, just before the feed-in tariff went down, and 
at one point I was sat in the room with probably all ten authorities being represented by 
different solicitors and in the end, just didn’t happen in time for the feed-in tariff.” This 
suggests that the ideal of collaboration is not being realised despite frequent deliberation 
amongst local authorities. 
 
A second issue that emerged involves the viability of market environmentalism. Operating at 
the city-region scale means “big business making big profits”, and some argued that this is 
not a good model for social landlords that are better placed to engage with local supply 
networks, SMEs and so on. A senior manager of Registered Provider 2 notes that, “There’s 
too many people in the AGMA circuit that are external that want to make big money and 
that’s where it all falls down.” This suggests a mismatch between the scale and ambitions of 
city region low-carbon governance and social housing retrofit, with the latter operating at a 
much more intimate scale. This mismatch was clearly manifested in the GM Green Deal/ 
ECO framework agreement that required substantial institutional demands from all partners. 
Senior Manager of Registered Provider 2 highlighted that the rules set by Government left 
only “a few massive players” in a position to operate, the chosen partners were Wates with 
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British Gas, Keepmoat with EDF and Wilmott Dixon (MAFC, 2014). When the much-
vaunted Green Deal was disbanded by Government in July 2015 (only a year after the 
Greater Manchester partnership was launched) the viability of this type of market 
environmentalism was brought into question. Meanwhile, the Government’s decision to 
drastically reduce Feed-In-Tariffs at the end of 2015 raised further questions about the 
viability of a market-based approach to retrofit.  
 
One of the success stories of the city region’s low carbon agenda involved an investment 
decision by Japan’s New Energy Development Organisation (NEDO) to fund a heat pump 
trial in Greater Manchester. GMCA received a £15-20 million pilot demonstration project 
that is primarily funded by the Japanese government to “break into the European market in 
heat pump technology” (GM Officer). The grant was a “government to government” 
investment, therefore only local authority-owned stock qualified for the scheme. The chief 
executive of Registered Provider 1 notes that, “I think what they liked about AGMA was the 
fact that AGMA had a captive audience [10 local authorities] and it had to be ALMOs 
because it’s what’s classed as a government to government scheme.” GM barely met the 
investment criterion, having only four ALMOs left in the entire city-region; one each in 
Manchester, Wigan and Leigh, Stockport and Bury, and three took part in the NEDO heat 
pump trials. The trials demonstrated how public ownership can be an attractive proposition to 
an international investor. However, the question of scale can be misleading. Greater 
Manchester implies “big” but the number of properties retrofitted remain modest (600) when 
compared to the size of the GM social housing stock (about 250,000). The scale of the NEDO 
trial is similar to what individual landlords have achieved. For example, in 2011, one GM 
landlord installed a biomass system to 487 homes and solar panels to 1,900 homes as part of a 
scheme funded by British Gas.      
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Social housing retrofit - “cash for carbon”  
A Parliamentary Select Committee report (ODPM 2004) notes a lack of policy coordination 
around the Decent Homes standard, energy efficiency and fuel poverty. The Committee 
detailed evidence of how the definition of thermal comfort in the DH programme became to 
mean effective heating and insulation, as opposed to taking account of fuel poverty (which 
was included in the original definition and then later omitted).  The bar was set low in an 
energy efficiency sense, as efficient heating could be classed as “any gas or oil 
programmable central heating or electric storage heaters or programmable LPG/solid fuel 
central heating or similarly efficient heating systems which are developed in the future“. 
Despite the low threshold for thermal comfort in Decent Homes, the Committee noted that in 
social rented sector “more homes fail on the thermal comfort criterion than any of the other 
three criteria” (ibid, paragraph 42).  
 
Certainly, some landlords interviewed had completed substantial insulation measures under 
Decent Homes: “Even in Decent Homes, we've done 12 million pound of insulation 
measures, we did three and a half million pound of cavity wall and loft insulation which was 
all 100% funded.” (Head of Investment, Registered Provider 3). However, the shift towards 
low carbon retrofit in social housing occurred towards the end of Decent Homes, after 
specific financial instruments were rolled out via the utility sector’s carbon obligations. 
Considering Decent Homes as a retrofit activity to address energy efficiency and fuel 
poverty, many stakeholders in the GM housing sector characterise it as a “missed 
opportunity” (CHARISMA project workshop 2014).   The utility sector recognised the 
potential of social housing landlords as institutional actors with capacity and social housing 
estates as “carbon banks”. The main waves of utility industry-led low carbon retrofit in social 
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housing were undertaken under the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) (2008- 
2012) and the Community Energy Saving Programme (CESP) (2009-2012), with many social 
landlords forming partnerships with the “big six” utility companies. This created a carbon 
market in the social housing sector. The sustainability manager for Registered Provider 2 
noted, “Carbon’s a big figure, there’s millions and millions of pounds being made every day 
from carbon”. 
 
While the Decent Homes standard was largely undertaken by social landlords, managed by 
in-house capital investment teams, low carbon retrofits instigated by the utility industry were 
markedly different. In GM, retrofit programmes were often initiated by the utility companies 
and delivered by their contractors, the social landlord’s role sometimes confined to brokering 
access to the neighbourhoods identified by industry analysts as providing the most carbon 
savings and having the correct socio-economic profile for the funding conditions. A 
programme officer of Registered Provider 4 notes, “It was determined by the geographical 
areas in which they [energy companies] were working … essentially the whole city was 
carved up into particular areas based on the housing stock and also the profile of the 
residents and how poor they were, basically.” And the head of investment for Registered 
Provider 3 added, “From our point of view we are governed by the way things are funded and 
CESP was targeted at the lower super output areas of the lowest 10 per cent.” 
More entrepreneurial and risk-taking landlords had sought funding to carry out their own 
retrofit schemes, combining different opportunities especially in renewable energy tariffs to 
create an income while collaborating with local private landlords. The sustainability manager 
of Registered Provider 2 notes: “There's lots of funding pots, RHI (Renewable Heat 
Incentive), you know, let's try and put, if you're orientations right let's bring in for that 
private landlord, let's bring in solar thermal then we claim RHI five, £600 a year on, you 
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know, and then you've got yourself an income there.” Meanwhile, several interviewees 
stressed that the regulatory framework around retrofit funding constrains creativity in the 
sector. The sustainability manager of Registered Provider 2 notes: “I’ve partnered with 
Npower and EDF so I can get some fully funded packages, depending on the carbon, because 
that’s what it’s about and that’s the side I’m working with […] kill two birds with one stone, 
trying to do things for the landlords and at the same time trying to give as much carbon to the 
big six.” Thus, there is an internal calculus to align the goals of the social housing providers 
with those of the energy providers and the government schemes. The chief executive of 
Registered Provider 1 notes: “The other long term option would be to actually earn an 
income […] so you could over an asset management plan put in air source heat pumps and 
then feed back into the grid […] that’s very, very optimistic and aspirational, but that’s what 
sits behind it all.” 
However, to be creative in market-based low carbon retrofit required skills that some felt 
were in short supply in social housing, and the risks involved were off-putting for many. 
Addressing the risks and complexity, a programme officer of Registered Provider 4 noted:  
“It's not about the funding either, if it's available, it's actually complying with all the Ofgem 
rules, those do need to be simplified because at the end of the day, you know, we're simply 
housing folk, it scares us off when we've got so many hoops to jump through that potentially 
could mean that the funding's not available at the end of a job. And I think there's a number 
of associations which have really had their fingers burnt on this, that we're promised a lot 
and unfortunately you get these development managers from the big [utility] companies and 
they promise a lot, but once you get into the nitty-gritty of it, there's actually a lot of problems 
with it.” 
20 
 
Improving the social housing stock helped the Labour administration to expand the 
demunicipalization project via voluntary stock transfers. In the later phase of market-led low 
carbon retrofit, social housing estates have become a pawn in the carbon market created by 
the demand for carbon by the utility industry to meet government policy objectives. British 
Gas provides an extreme example of a closed loop circuit for “cash for carbon’ in social 
housing, where the cash ultimately returns to them, as explained by head of investment of 
Registered Provider 3: 
“People like Npower or Eon […] They will fund you, they will literally give you cash for 
carbon […] British Gas approach is different, if they’ve got hundreds of millions of pounds 
to get rid of to buy carbon, what British Gas have been doing over a number of years is 
buying those companies that deliver those things […] so what they now do is approach 
housing providers and they say we will give you x amount of funding but we’ll also deliver 
the measures for you. So on one hand they’re getting rid of money and on another hand 
they’ve got money coming in”. 
 
The market-based retrofit logic is conducive to carbon-focussed valorisation of community 
benefit. This accounts for the target households’ relative poverty and the characteristics of the 
built environment as measured by the Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) rating. The next 
section considers the agency and values that social landlords bring to bear in low carbon retrofit 
practices, and the motivations that landlords have in participating in the carbon market.  
 
Landlord motivations for low carbon retrofit 
When discussing the motivations for low carbon retrofit schemes, carbon control was low on 
the list of priorities of social housing providers. Landlords often used carbon as a necessary 
‘hook’ to secure funding but their subsequent strategies often had a very different focus. The 
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organising principles of community-based retrofit had more to do with sustainability in a 
broader sense, to ensure the landlord’s ability to provide housing to low income and 
vulnerable people in a climate of austerity and rising energy prices. Landlords described their 
retrofit ‘business case’ to be about securing rental income and stock viability, as well as 
tenants’ welfare and alleviating fuel poverty, as explained by project officer of Registered 
Provider 4: “The priority really was on that, trying to reduce fuel poverty for our tenants and 
I suppose in the long run make them [properties] more sustainable and lettable because 
people in the future will be looking at the performance ... how energy efficient the property is 
when they’re deciding whether to rent it or not”. Sustainability officer of Registered Provider 
5 made the same point: “If we can help them save money, ultimately they're likely to come out 
of fuel poverty, or not get into fuel poverty and they may be able to afford their rent”.  
 
It was clear that retrofit strategies were influenced by the impact of austerity policies and the 
welfare reform on people’s income, and the operational risks this created for the landlord, as 
the sustainability manager of Registered Provider 2 explains: 
“It was all about bills, it was all about getting the fabric of the building correct […] we knew 
the current climate with the universal credit coming in, we didn’t know how bad it was going 
to be but it’s the way it is, we’re going to lose probably the best side of a million pound this 
year on that, so therefore with utility bills going up as well, you know, people are less likely 
to pay the rent. So we’re trying to attack is if we’ve got a property that’s warm, cosy and 
affordable to live in, that’s free from damp, free from mould, well, and it’s cheap to pay your 
bills, there’s more chance of them then paying their rent on time, and preferably staying in 
that house longer”.  
 
The chief executive of Registered Provider 1 also highlights a similar concern:  
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“The key reasons over the past year there’s been increasing pressure on people’s income, as 
I say our key goal is to try and help tenants reduce their fuel bills […] in theory the driver for 
that is the lower the fuel bills are the more likely they are the pay the rent”. 
The more entrepreneurial landlords saw the emerging low carbon market as a business 
opportunity, recognising how ultimately any income generated in this way would be 
beneficial in the longer term, as noted by the chief executive of Registered Provider 
1:“Everything we do really is aimed at trying to make our tenants more comfortable […] so 
there is a community priority there as well, although, it’s difficult to say that we’re doing this 
just for the community because in reality we’re not, it’s a pilot which goes beyond just the 
community, but having just said that, if we were to earn an income all that income will go 
back into investment”.  
The reality of market-based retrofit reveals numerous conflicts and potential risks for the 
landlord, even when retrofit schemes are proposed as requiring no investment and no or low 
risk. The rules of the carbon market give little margin for error, and potentially offer a 
perverse incentive for ill-conceived retrofit schemes, as argued by Sustainability manager of 
Registered Provider 2: “There’s too many people out there that don’t know how it all works 
but are selling it and they’re selling the wrong thing, because they know, once you bank your 
carbon that’s it you can’t go back again, that’s gone, you’ll never be able to do that again 
even if it’s all done wrong you can’t bank it again, you only get one shot at this, that’s what 
I‘m trying to tell people don’t rush into anything” . 
The interviewee referred to another unnamed landlord in the city region who replaced gas 
boilers with air source heat pumps. However, the retrofit was badly designed with respect to 
insulation and ventilation and the landlord had to pay for the old system to be restored after 
six months. Learning from mistakes is essential for the sector, and indeed it was suggested 
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that a climate of carbon control has revitalised the “historic lack of asset management 
approach” (Chief Executive, Registered Provider 1) in the housing sector. This involves 
moving away from retrofit projects towards integrating retrofit activities into asset 
management plans that typically span 30 years. The risks associated with managing assets 
over a 30-year period reveals the risks of short-term opportunities such as feed-in tariffs that 
are influenced by short term political cycles in the UK context. 
 
While learning from mistakes is important, evaluation of actual long term carbon savings 
from retrofit was far from an established practice. The lack of evaluation is influenced by 
how Ofgem regulates grant funding and its over-reliance on the before and after EPC. Most 
social housing providers directed a great deal of resources towards securing funds, and 
delivering the retrofit schemes, while devoting little or no funding to evaluate the long term 
impacts. There were a few exceptions to this, with some landlords installing energy monitors 
in retrofitted homes, trying out different solutions in demonstration or pilot projects, and 
engaging with residents in dialogue at planned community meetings. But for the most part, 
evaluation of low carbon retrofit was not prioritised.  
 
The research community have recognised the lack of retrofit evaluation for some time. 
Stevenson and Leaman (2010, p. 439) note that there is a “lack of discussion concerning 
evaluation methods in the domestic sector” and this was echoed by the interviewed landlords. 
Systemic evaluations of social housing retrofit are rare, perhaps the most substantial 
evaluation in England is by Gentoo in the North East (Gentoo, 2013). A smaller scheme in 
Cambridge City Council as part of a TSB funded project was evaluated by Sunikka-Blank 
and colleagues (2011), noting that the predicted and actual efficiency savings were 
misaligned, largely due to resident behaviour (see also Elsharkawy & Rutherford, 2015). 
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Notably, energy consumption in social housing can be substantially different from ‘standard’ 
assumptions in the RdSAP, which is used for planning low carbon retrofit.  Gentoo concluded 
that social tenants on low incomes often under heat their homes and thus, EPC results can be 
misleading (Gentoo, 2013). 
 
Conclusions 
The low carbon agenda is increasingly mobilised through local governance mechanisms. The 
social housing stock, its condition and maintenance, have been used as a political pawn under 
successive administrations for the purpose of demunicipalization that strips material assets 
away from local government ownership. The most recent example of this the “borrowing 
cap” for local authorities that comes at a time when there is an increased pressure to invest in 
housing to meet low carbon targets. It is typical of the policy reforms that improved stock 
condition is used as a prize for voluntary privatisation of council housing. There is then an 
underlying neoliberal ideology being pursued through the means of the seemingly benign 
objective of housing improvement or more recently, low carbon performance. The national, 
international or local carbon markets however do not adhere to a specific ideological project 
about council-owned homes. Evidence was found to suggest that public ownership may be an 
asset in the low carbon economy. In the case of government-to-government Japanese 
investment on heat pump trials, local government ownership of the participating housing 
stock was a prerequisite condition.  
 
The GM experience highlights the “repositioning” of social housing whereby it is brought to 
the fore in sub-regional economic and carbon governance. At the sub-regional level, the 
social housing stock is touted as a test bed for new low carbon products and services in order 
to stimulate the wider retrofit market. Meanwhile, a public sector service is repositioned into 
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serving the forces of market environmentalism. The Greater Manchester carbon geography is 
a construct based on an argument by the policy elite that favours big business. It is dependent 
on Whitehall deals on the one hand, and willing local partners such as social landlords, on the 
other. However, the GM social housing landscape is institutionally and geographically more 
diverse than the jurisdiction of the ten local authorities forming GM, and organisationally the 
social housing sector continues to be in flux as a consequence of UK government policy.   
 
The results of market-based retrofit in GM are patchy. Typical schemes ranged from a few 
streets to e.g. individual or groups of tower blocks, rarely involving more than a few hundred 
households at a time, almost exclusively associated with just one landlord. The GM policy 
construct has strengths too, carbon control has given rise to increased collaboration in sub-
regional governance, but the rhetoric surrounding economies of scale in the city region runs 
well ahead of the reality. Low carbon retrofit schemes in Greater Manchester look more 
promising as a test bed for learning from smaller projects, such as pilots and demonstrators, 
with the GM policy platform providing a space for sharing lessons learned.  In terms of future 
research priorities in this field, there is an obvious gap in longer term evaluation of market-
based retrofit in social housing. Also, the long term implications of the latest wave of 
privatisation and other rapid institutional changes in the social housing sector should be better 
understood in light of the ongoing crisis in affordable housing in the UK.  
 
Finally, the interests of different actors in the low carbon retrofit market do not align neatly in 
the sub-regional space, nor do they align from the perspective of underlying aims and 
objectives. Social landlords are foregrounded in the carbon control activities of the city 
region polity because of the historic collectivities associated with the sector, especially with 
former council stock. Their potential in stimulating the sub-regional retrofit market and 
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hitting territorial carbon targets is an asset in carbon governance. However, retrofitting low 
income housing delivers only modest carbon savings, often below estimated levels based on 
SAP ratings.  What is more, social tenants have been targeted through the austerity 
programme of welfare cuts, and these reforms have institutional impacts on social landlords, 
creating operational risks in terms of rental income and sustainability of tenancies. The 
carbon agenda is then mobilised by social landlords to pursue a multitude of aims via retrofit, 
including future proofing the stock and ensuring business viability by alleviating fuel 
poverty. The end result for retrofit is that carbon objectives are diluted, but this may be a 
more progressive outcome than the alternative, focused strictly on curbing emissions.  It does, 
however, question the fit between market-based financial instruments for low carbon retrofit, 
and social housing.  
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Table 1: Local authority housing stock in Greater Manchester 
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Local 
authority 
Housing organisation Institutional arrangement Approx. stock 
size 
Bolton Bolton At Home  
www.boltonathome.org.uk 
ALMO since 2002, stock transfer in 
2011 
18,000 
Bury  Six Town Housing 
www.sixtownhousing.org 
ALMO since 2005 8,000 
Manchest
er 
 
 
Northwards Housing  
www.northwardshousing.co.uk 
 
 
ALMO since 2005  13,000 
 Southway Housing Trust (Manchester) 
Ltd  
http://www.southwayhousing.co.uk 
Stock transfer in 2007 6,000 
 City South Manchester Housing Trust 
Ltd (now called One Manchester after 
merger with Eastlands Homes in 2015) 
www.onemanchester.co.uk 
 
Stock transfer in 2008, merger in 
2015 
4,500 
 Parkway Green Housing Trust and 
Willow Park Housing Trust, now part of 
Wythenshawe Community Housing 
Group (WCHG) 
www.wchg.org.uk 
Stock transfers in 2006 and 1999 
respectively, merger in 2013 to 
create WCHG 
14,000 
 Mossbank Homes 
www.msvhousing.co.uk 
Stock transfer in 2007-8, creating a 
subsidiary of Manchester-based 
Mosscare Housing. Mosscare 
merged with St Vincents in July 
2017. 
1,100 
 Eastlands Homes (now called One 
Manchester after merger with City South 
in 2015) 
www.onemanchester.co.uk 
Stock transfers in 2003 and 2009, 
merger in 2015 
8,000 
 Brunswick and Miles Platting PFIs - 
regeneration involving refurbishment, 
demolitions and new build  
https://www.adactushousing.co.uk/Infor
mation/140 (Miles Platting) 
http://s4bmanchester.co.uk/about-us/ 
(Brunswick) 
The City Council retains ownership 
of stock; housing management and 
services provided by an external 
PFI partner over 25-30 years 
650 and 
1,500  
Oldham First Choice Oldham  
www.fcho.co.uk/ 
ALMO since 2002, stock transfer in 
2011 
12,000 
Rochdale Rochdale Boroughwide Housing  
www.rbh.org.uk/ 
ALMO since 2002, stock transfer in 
2012 
13,750 
Salford Salix Homes  
www.salixhomes.org 
ALMO since 2007, stock transfer in 
2015 
8,500 
 City West Housing Trust 
www.citywesthousingtrust.org.uk 
Stock transfer in 2008, later merged 
with ForViva Group 
14,800 
Stockport Stockport Homes  ALMO since 2005  12,000 
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Tameside New Charter Housing (North) Ltd and 
New Charter Housing (South)  
www.newcharterhomes.co.uk/ 
 
 
Large scale voluntary stock transfer 
in 2000, North and South merged in 
2008, creating New Charter Homes 
Ltd. Later merger with Aksa Homes 
(Oldham) and Gedling Homes, 
(Nottingham), created New Charter 
Housing Trust Group. In 2017, a 
merger has been announced with 
Adactus. 
20,000 
(combine
d stock 
33,000 
after 
merger 
with 
Adactus) 
 Ashton Pioneer Homes  
www.ashtonpioneerhomes.co.uk 
Stock transfer completed in 1999, 
stock concentrated in one ward in 
Ashton Under Lyne 
1,000 
Trafford  Trafford Housing Trust  
www.traffordhousingtrust.co.uk/ 
Large scale voluntary stock transfer 
in 2005 
9,000 
Wigan Wigan and Leigh Housing  
www.wigan.gov.uk/Resident/Housing/ 
ALMO created in 2002, Wigan 
Council  published plans in 2017 to 
regain direct control of the stock 
22,000 
 
